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Abstract. This  article  analyzes  couples’  attitudes  towards  the  third-party  role  in  Assisted
Reproductive Technologies with gamete donation, and problematizes parenthood and kinship. I base
my analysis on 66 in-depth interviews with different ART actors (from beneficiaries to professionals)
in France and Portugal, conducted as part of a research project already completed. Special focus is
given to 19 interviews with heterosexual and homosexual couples who used third-party reproduction
in  Europe  and  the  United  States.  I  found  a  physical  and  moral  detachment  operation  among
heterosexual and lesbian couples vis-a-vis the donor of reproductive potential, who is depersonalized
and reduced  to  a  functionality.  The  objective  is  to  preserve  the  intimacy of  the  couple  and  the
autonomy of  the  parental  project.  This  contrasts  with  innovative  and  enlarged  family  dynamics
developed by gay couples, who integrate both female figures (surrogate and oocyte donor) in their
children’s family history, through bonding efforts in a logic of reciprocity (gift and counter-gift). The
purpose is to reject the negative image of a woman’s body being commodified while preserving the
natural appearance of procreation. I conclude that a naturalist conception of kinship persists —one
based on shared biogenetic substances that bind together one parent and the donor-conceived child—
along with the centrality of biological processes such as pregnancy and childbirth. There are different
ways of easing tensions inherent to the contractual intervention of third parties in the reproductive
process.  ART re-elaborates  the  line of  demarcation  between commodities  and  gifts  and  between
living things and human beings, while reconfiguring family concepts.
Keywords: Assisted  Reproductive  Technologies;  Gamete  Donation;  Surrogacy;  Third  Parties;
(Homo) Parenthood; Kinship.
[es] Tensiones dilemáticas en torno a la paternidad: el ambiguo papel de 
terceros en las Tecnologías de Reproducción Asistida y subrogación en 
Francia y Portugal
Resumen.  Este  artículo  analiza  las  actitudes  de  las  parejas  hacia  el  papel  de  terceros  en  las
Tecnologías  de  Reproducción  Asistida  (ART)  con  la  donación  de  gametos,  y  problematiza  la
paternidad y el parentesco. Baso mi análisis en 66 entrevistas en profundidad con diferentes actores
de ART (desde beneficiarios hasta profesionales) en Francia y Portugal, realizadas como parte de un
proyecto de investigación ya completado. Se presta especial atención a 19 entrevistas con parejas
heterosexuales  y  homosexuales  que  utilizaron reproducción de terceros  en  Europa  y  los  Estados
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Unidos. Encontré una operación de desapego físico y moral entre parejas heterosexuales y lesbianas
frente al donante con potencial reproductivo, que se despersonaliza y se reduce a una funcionalidad.
El objetivo es preservar la intimidad de la pareja y la autonomía del proyecto parental. Esto contrasta
con  la  dinámica  familiar  innovadora  y  ampliada  desarrollada  por  las  parejas  homosexuales,  que
integran figuras femeninas (donante sustituto y ovocito) en la historia familiar de sus hijos, a través de
esfuerzos de unión en una lógica de reciprocidad (regalo y contra-regalo). El propósito es rechazar la
imagen negativa de que el cuerpo de una mujer sea mercantilizado mientras se preserva la apariencia
natural  de  la  procreación.  Concluyo que  persiste  una  concepción  naturalista  del  parentesco,  una
basada en sustancias biogenéticas compartidas que unen a uno de los padres y al hijo concebido por el
donante, junto con la centralidad de los procesos biológicos como el embarazo y el parto. Existen
diferentes formas de aliviar las tensiones inherentes a la intervención contractual de terceros en el
proceso reproductivo. ART reelabora la línea de demarcación entre mercancías y regalos y entre seres
vivos y seres humanos, mientras reconfigura los conceptos familiares.
Palabras clave: tecnologías de reproducción asistida; donación de gametos; subrogación; terceros;
(homo)paternidad; parentesco.
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1. Introduction
This paper analyses dilemmatic tensions around parenthood and kinship among
couples using Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) with third-party gamete
donation  and/or  surrogacy  to  conceive.  These  tensions  occur  between  two
contradictory  principles:  the  right  of  a  child  to  know her  genetic  or  biological
origins and the right of a donor to remain anonymous. Although people have long
been  debating  over  which  of  these  should  take  priority,  donor  anonymity  is
currently prioritised by French law and, until very recently, the same was true in
Portugal.
ART is about making babies and parents simultaneously, through a complex
process where biological reproduction is intertwined with the personal, political,
and technological meanings of reproduction. Nevertheless, tensions between legal,
biological and social conceptions of parenthood prevail.
The  paper  describes  couples’  attitudes  towards  the  third  party  involved  in
assisted conception in both countries. On the one hand, we witness detachment
dynamics in physical and moral terms in heterosexual couples  —and to a lesser
extent  in  lesbian  couples2—regarding  the  third-party  donor,  through  a
differentiation between living things (gametes) and human beings (children). The
heterosexual women interviewed see any potential close relationship with the third-
2 For this article, I intentionally chose to focus on heterosexual and gay male couples to the detriment of lesbian
couples, because although most of the latter also opt for anonymous donors, they do not express such deep
concerns about third parties as heterosexual women do. This may be due to a range of contextual differences
between  oocyte  and  sperm  donations.  Nevertheless,  specific  lesbian  couples’  preferences  concerning
biogenetic links are discussed at various points in this article where deemed relevant.
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party donor (oocytes and/or sperm) negatively. Furthermore, the prospect of lifting
donor  anonymity  is  perceived  as  disturbing.  They  are  embarrassed  about  or
negatively judge the possibility that the third-party donor might intrude into the
intimate relationship they have with their spouse and child or with their own body.
This process reaches the point of erasing the third party, which is totally eliminated
from the private sphere. In this context, I introduce the concept of an operation of
detachment  (Delaunay,  2017)  to  analyze  the  strategies  developed  by  these
heterosexual women that allow them to keep the donor at a reassuring distance.
On the other hand  —and contrary to this dual, ambivalent, even problematic
relationship— the gay couples encountered embrace enlarged familial  dynamics
and make  bonding efforts. More specifically, French gay couples build closeness
with the surrogate and sometimes also maintain contact  with the oocyte donor,
although they  do  so  without  knowing her  identity  in  a  semi-anonymized legal
framework  in  the  case  of  the  USA3,  where  the  child  can  only  contact  her  on
reaching the age of 18. These gay couples integrate both female figures (surrogate
and  oocyte  donor)  into  the  personal  story  of  their  children,  since  they  are
considered as having an important role that cannot be erased.
The  fundamental  tension  lies  in  the  fact  that  heterosexual  couples  have  to
negotiate  the difficulty of  being infertile with having to introduce a  third-party
donation in their project to have a child; an ambiguous experience of both finding a
solution  and  introducing  a  possible  new  form  of  disruption  in  their  lives,  in
addition to a diagnosis of infertility. “Disrupted lives” (Becker, 1997) refers to a
biographical  rupture  and discontinuity due to  major  emotional  crises  that  force
people  to  reorganize  their  plans  and  expectations,  as  well  as  to  give  another
meaning to their lives.
Although the discussion of couples’ different attitudes towards third parties is
based on a  contrast  between heterosexual  users  of  ART (artificial  insemination
with donor sperm,  in vitro fertilization with egg, sperm or double donation) and
same-sex users of surrogacy (gestational surrogacy), this does not mean that these
differences are connected to sexual orientation; rather, they pertain to different uses
of reproductive technologies.
2. Methodology
Building upon previous research, I will  present a new theoretical and empirical
approach to  the  topics  discussed.  On the  one  hand,  I  introduce  new analytical
concepts to reflect on and better understand the renegotiation of kinship practices
and  norms,  a  renegotiation  that  stems  from  contemporary  uses  of  third-party
reproduction. My focus here is on parents’ perceptions of the role of third parties.
On  the  other  hand,  the  France-Portugal  comparison  can  provide  data  to
complement  existing studies  on this  subject.  Furthermore,  empirically-grounded
insights into the differences between heterosexual and gay couples’ uses of third
3 In the case of France, where surrogacy is not allowed, the legal framework on oocyte donors depends on the
destination country chosen by the French couples.
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party reproduction shed light on the (comparatively) under-researched topic of gay
surrogacy4.
I  base  my  analysis  on  66  semistructured  in-depth  interviews  with  different
actors  related  to  ART  (beneficiaries,  doctors,  biologists,  members  of  ethics
committees  and  members  of  parliament),  in  France  and  Portugal.  In  total,  I
conducted 20 interviews with ART beneficiaries (ten in France and ten in Portugal)
and 46 among professionals (22 in France and 24 in Portugal)5.
In  this  article,  I  focus especially  on interviews  with ART beneficiaries:  ten
interviews with women6 in heterosexual couples (five French and five Portuguese)
who have chosen to resort to artificial insemination (AI) or  in vitro fertilization
(IVF) with third-party donors (oocyte, sperm or both) in their own countries or
abroad; five interviews with lesbian couples or just one of the partners (four in
Portugal and one in France) who have turned to sperm banks in Spain, Belgium or
Denmark; and interviews with four French gay male couples7 —or just one of the
partners— who have resorted to a process that  engages both a surrogate and a
separate oocyte donor in the USA.
To reach heterosexual beneficiaries, I published a message on the websites of
two infertility associations (the Portuguese Association of Fertility and the French
Association MAIA) explaining the nature and scope of the research project and
asking  for  personal  testimonies.  Same-sex  couples  were  found  through  LGBT
associations (which campaign for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex rights),
where I left a message describing the aim of the study and asking about couples’
experience, or through a network of informal contacts.
Empirical data was collected between January 2013 and April 2016 as part of
my post-doctoral  project,  which analyzed controversies  and tensions,  visible  or
invisible, around ART with gamete donation in France and Portugal. Although it
does  not  systematically  compare  France  and  Portugal,  this  article  emphasizes
similar existential problems which arise in different national contexts.  I seek to
stress  the  complexity  of  third-party  reproduction  by  drawing  attention  to  the
internal paradoxes or tensions specific to this biomedical device, but also to bring
to light beneficiaries’ personal limits in both France and Portugal. For this paper, I
4 It should however be clarified that not only gay men resort to surrogacy. Thus there is a whole analysis about
heterosexual and lesbian couples, as well as single people, who decide to have children through surrogacy.
5 As my research was qualitative, interviewees were selected not through a statistical criterion, but because they
were accessible and available to be interviewed (convenience sampling). The criterion of being voluntary for
the study was mainly valid in the specific case of the beneficiaries (homo and heterosexual), since ethical
reasons prevented all the elements of these groups from being identified. However, I did attempt to interview
a considerable number of people in each of these groups, and also to meet the criterion of diversity (namely by
ensuring that the health professionals I talked to from the public and private sectors worked in geographically
distinct  institutions  and that  the  deputies  were  from different  political  parties).  Being a  non-probabilistic
sample, we cannot generalize from the results I obtained with statistical precision.  Nor it  was considered
relevant to present socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the interviewees.
6 None of  the  male  partners  was available  to  be  questioned,  even if  they were  present  at  the  time of  the
interview and the interviewer asked them directly to give their testimony too. It is therefore women who speak
on this subject, either when participating in infertility associations’ online discussion forums (where men are
almost entirely absent), or when responding to interview requests (for academic studies or media reports).
This may be due to the fact that ART technologies always involve the medicalization of women’s bodies,
regardless  of  the  origin  of  the  infertility  problem (female  or  male),  and  also because  women are  under
pressure, hoping for a successful pregnancy.
7 I only interviewed gay male couples in France. The difficulty of finding Portuguese users of surrogacy may be
due either to factors external to the study itself —such as different social or legal attitudes to gay surrogacy—
or variations in my approach to the field.
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intentionally  focused  on  the  most  challenging  situations  faced  by  beneficiaries
concerning the third-party donor, in order to highlight certain institutional flaws
and disorders in the procedure governing the use of third-party genetic contribution
in ART.
Beyond ART being subject to quite similar legal frameworks in both countries,
each has its own institutional particularities. Both France (through Law No. 2011-
814 of 7th July 2011 on bioethics and Art. L. 2141-2 of the Code of Public Health)
and  Portugal  (under  Law No.  32/2006  of  26th July  2006)8 adopt  a  therapeutic
approach to ART. A couple must prove they have health problems (either infertility
or risk of disease transmission) in order to acquire the ART beneficiary status. To
these medical  conditions are added certain social  conditions:  the interest  of  the
child to be born to a stable and united parental couple, and the choices that society
makes by establishing certain forms of parenthood. Surrogacy was forbidden in
both countries. It should be noted that in France, gamete donation is completely
free because it  is  historically established as  analogous to the donation of  other
human  body  products  (blood,  bone  marrow).  Conversely,  in  Portugal,  donors
receive  a  fixed  amount  of  monetary  compensation,  set  by  the  national  ethics
committee, as reimbursement for expenses and inconveniences (time, discomfort
and risk) resulting from the gamete retrieval and transfer procedure.
3. Between proximity and distance to the third-party donor
The  Public  Gametes  Bank  in  Portugal  and  the  CECOS9 in  France  function
according  to  the  similarity  rule,  i.e.  the  matching  of  donors  and  recipients
according to ethnic or morphological  criteria (color of skin,  eyes and hair)  and
blood type.  The  purpose  and justification  for  this  pairing  is  to  naturalize10 the
reproduction process (as a simulacrum of natural human conception), to promote
identification between parents and their  children (to include them in the family
genealogy and to protect them all from destabilizing questions), and to maintain the
confidentiality of the progenitor’s identity guaranteed by donor anonymity.
Physical similarities —even if they do not stem from genetics— are associated
with  the  biological  (nature)  and  function  as  clear  “proof”  of  the  coincidence
between parenthood and procreation (Fortier, 2009). Since it is related to physical
8 In Portugal, the 2006 ART law was changed in mid-2016 (through Law No. 17/2016, of 20 th June 2016),
opening up ART to all women – regardless of their marital status or sexual orientation – and thus covering
both single people and lesbian couples. At the same time, heterosexual couples were given access to surrogacy
in a restricted range of medical situations that prevent pregnancy – such as the congenital or acquired absence
of a functioning uterus – although they were prohibited from making any payment for surrogacy services
except as reimbursement for medical costs directly related to the pregnancy (Law No. 25/2016, of 22 th August
2016).  In  April  2018,  the  Constitutional  Court  —asked to give  its  opinion on recent  legislative  changes
regarding surrogacy— ruled against anonymous gamete donation on the basis of children’s fundamental right
to  personal  identity  and  personality  development  (Constitutional  Court  ruling  No.  225/2018).  But  my
interviews correspond to an earlier legislative context.
9 CECOS - Centres d’Etudes et de Conservation des Œufs et du Sperme.
10 I use the term “naturalize” in an ontological sense (and not epistemologically or anthropologically): that of
eliminating or seeking to eliminate from our ontology all objects and properties that come under morality or
sociology (the gamete donation and the third-party donor), in favour of others that refer to observable objects
and physical properties. In this case, the latter are physiognomic similarities between prospective parents and
donor-conceived children, but also biological processes such as a woman’s pregnancy and childbirth.
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appearance (visibility), it introduces a continuity of lineage (resemblance) where
there is a discontinuity of biology (lack of genetic links).
In both France and Portugal, the law prohibits the selection of potential donors
of biogenic substances in some cases; these interdictions transcribe implicit social
norms,  excluding  third-party  donors  whose  proximity  is  too  marked,  or  whose
distance  is  too  pronounced.  As  can  be  seen  in  the  following  extracts,  family
members  (sisters,  for  example)  and  close  relations  of  mutual  acquaintance
(someone known such as a neighbor) as well  as donors with ethnic differences
(non-matching in phenotypic and genotypic terms) are prohibited. The underlying
reason is that these situations could lead to discomfort, conflict or disruption within
the family or between the family and others, including donors.
I prefer anonymity. It’s not for legal reasons, it’s a matter of [avoiding] confusion
later. My sister told me, “Oh, I want to donate! If I donate everything will be fine”.
Surely not! Why make room for confusion? There is  no reason to risk a family
drama at some point. (Isa,11 Portuguese, 39 y/o, married, 3 y/o daughter)
I just wanted him to be Caucasian. If he was black or of another race, it would be a
little odd, wouldn’t it? With this idea of not telling anyone, it wouldn’t have gone
well.  (...)  If  he was a Portuguese donor,  he could even be my neighbor,  I  don’t
know. And sometimes it can happen, perhaps, a surprise, the child could look like
someone I know. (...) I don’t know who the donor is and it doesn’t matter! But the
fact that he is Spanish has given me some assurance and, in principle, he’s not very
close (Bia, Portuguese 34 y/o, married, 4 y/o twins).
I have Polish origins, so I thought it was nice to use a donor who was from Eastern
Europe  [Czech  Republic].  (...)  Of  course,  it  was  important  for  us  that  she  was
anonymous. (...) We didn’t want to know who she is. She is a good fairy who helps
us but to have a face, a name, to know more, it’s not useful for us (Lily, French, 38
y/o, civil union, no children).
I think it has to be anonymous (...) I prefer not to know who made the donation.
For various reasons. It would probably create bonds, because I would like to know,
and vice versa,  and it might be a bit odd (Dani,  Portuguese,  39 y/o, married, no
children).
If I knew who he was, it would make me feel uncomfortable, because I would say
to myself "it’s him". I would feel uneasy. Here, at least, I tell myself that the fact
that he is anonymous, it can be anyone. (...) But if I know who he is, there will be
this worry. While if he is anonymous, I don’t have that worry. The donor doesn’t
know that it’s me and I don’t know it’s him (Chloe, French, 38 y/o, married, 4 y/o
and 1 y/o twins).
In France, the first bioethics laws of 1994 established the irreversible anonymity of
gamete donors according to the “model of a carnal pseudo-procreation” based on
“the misleading use of the presumption of paternity” (Théry & Leroyer, 2014: 17
11 All names cited in the excerpts from our interviews have been changed in order to protect the interviewees’
privacy and anonymity.
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and 54) —the sterile husband is considered the child’s father— and the denial of
the gift.
In  ART processes,  the  conflict  between  the  right  of  the  child  to  know her
origins and the right of the gamete donor to remain anonymous leads us to question
social representations and values (related to nature, technique and kinship), which
generate  tensions  between  contradictory  principles  (Cadoret  &  Wilgaux,  2007;
Delaunay, 2015).
The debate between supporters and opponents of maintaining gamete donors’
anonymity corresponds to two different conceptions of parenthood: it opposes the
social and the child’s right to know her origins, on one side, to the natural and the
need to preserve a traditional family model, on the other (Mathieu, 2013). Some
authors thus propose a new parental model that they call “pluriparentality” (Théry,
2010), which introduces other parents into the process of conceiving a new life.
However,  as  I  will  now demonstrate,  heterosexual  couples  find  that  certain
arrangements  ease  tensions  and  anxiety  associated  with  the  uncomfortable  and
disturbing presence or proximity of a third-party.
4. Dual relationships to gamete donors in AI/IVF
The heterosexual women interviewed in both countries had similar biographical
and  care  pathways  regarding  family-formation  and  reproductive  issues.  It  is
marked  by  a  succession  of  hardships,  failures  and  new  starts  —generating
uncertainty—  and  by  the  difficult  experience  of  sterility  (the  identity  crisis
associated with the diagnosis of infertility).
When  the  couple  decided  to  have  children,  the  woman  stopped  taking  the
contraceptive pill; then, due to the non-occurrence of a pregnancy in the following
year,  the couple searched for medical  help.  In the case of men diagnosed with
azoospermia, the couple was soon offered sperm donation when intracytoplasmic
sperm injection (ICSI) didn’t work. On the contrary, women with endometriosis or
premature ovarian failure were subjected, over a decade, to several attempted ART
treatments,  namely  artificial  insemination  (AI)  and  in  vitro fertilization  (IVF),
before opting for oocyte donation or double gamete donation (oocytes and sperm).
The women interviewed claim a right to the use of third-party reproduction not
only in the name of their personal desire to have a child, but in the name of a
general conception of what is right for all couples in that situation, that is to say,
the right to be parents even for those with infertility problems.
The interviewees use different types of argument not only to criticize possible
interferences  of  the  third-party  donor,  male  or  female  —I  have  not  found  a
gendered  logic—  but  also  to  justify  their  own  options.  The  justification  for
choosing  a  third-party  donor  is  based  on  an  instrumental  view  of  action  that
privileges the principle of utility, evaluating behaviors according to their effects.
Third-party gametes are resources valued for their effectiveness and functionality,
for their reproductive potential, i.e. their capacity to help to generate a child, under
medical conditions, within an infertile couple.
The interviewees assess the legitimate options for having a child, identifying
third-party reproduction as the goal to pursue; likewise, they value pregnancy as
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the desired state to achieve (or already achieved). The interviewees thus emphasize
the importance of selecting donors who have “good gametes”, that is to say, who
can provide higher fertility success rates, quality of embryos and development of
the fetus (efficacy). This abstract evaluation of third-party donors and gametes by
infertile  couples  appropriates  and  retranslates  the  medical  discourse  on  ART,
which  conveys  an  anonymized and  biologizing  conception  of  gamete  donation
(Delaunay & Martins, 2015).
For the Portuguese women interviewed, suppressing the existence of the female
donor as a person and taking away all her rights over the as-yet-unborn or already
existing child led to criticism of her economic interest. As the following extract
highlights, the motivation attributed to the donor is the financial benefit of oocyte
donation (monetary compensation) and not altruism, which is contrasted with close
emotional bonds (the love of the mother who gives birth to her child). There is
moral judgment of the donor, who must be held accountable for her actions within
a contractual agreement under which she received money.
It’s  financial.  This is  not  altruism. (...)  Because  the donor at  that  time had no
feelings, on the contrary, I think it is a very exhausting process. It has nothing to do
with love. (...) The donor made a donation, signed a contract, received money for a
troublesome medical procedure and all that. She accepted, it’s over. And I think she
must be aware of that. And I hope that, legally, it becomes very clear. (...) Since she
sold because she was paid. And she had no personal experience with this child. So I
think that in this case she has no rights, either personal nor legal” (Isa, Portuguese,
39 y/o, married, 3 y/o daughter).
ART with third-party donors cannot be considered as a treatment to cure a sterile
person since it is “a new way to conceive a child” (Théry, 2010: 17). It is based on
the  cooperation  between  a  pair  of  institutional  parents  (only  one  of  whom
conceives) and a gamete donor who gives his/her procreative potential to enable
them  to  carry  out  a  parental  project.  Furthermore,  although  very  diverse
arrangements  exist  or  have  existed  in  the  societies  traditionally  studied  by
anthropologists  (Lévi-Strauss,  2013),  this  arrangement  is  a  novelty  in  our
contemporary society, especially because specific technologies are used.
Donors  can  be  regarded  both  in  a  positive  light,  allowing  conception  and
childbirth, and as a threat, competing with intended parents; hence the prevalence
of a strictly material role for donors, i.e. gamete donation needed for reproductive
purposes (Martial, 2012). The “depersonalization of gametes” ensures that the child
is  not  born  from  a  particular  person,  but  from  “interchangeable  reproduction
material” (Théry, 2010: 14).
It was a detail, a way to overcome this situation and achieve this end. It was the
only way we, as a couple, found, with the medical teams, to get to have this child.
There is an important role for the donor, but this child’s birth depends on us (Dani,
Portuguese, 39 y/o, married, no children).
Heterosexual  couples  using  ART present  an  instrumental  relationship  with  the
donor. The donor is regarded as a mere technical object for medical purposes, a
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means to a goal: the donor is a gamete provider; whose genetic material will be
retrieved for implantation elsewhere. The child’s desire to know her genetic origins
(the gamete  donor) is  perceived as  mere curiosity  by both the couples  and the
doctors interviewed, thus reducing its importance and scope.
Even when donation is perceived as an act of generosity (as a gift in Mauss’
sense of pure donation) by the women surveyed, they deny the donor all rights over
the child. The gametes are reduced to cells, presented only as co-adjuvants in the
process (utilitarian value). French interviewees go so far as to compare gametes
with other body parts, such as blood or bone marrow, thus adopting the official
discourse on donation (especially evident in the laws of bioethics).
They gave gametes. It’s not their child. It’s like me, when I give my blood or
when I give bone marrow. (...) They have no rights in the life of my children. (...) A
child is a fetus, but these are cells (Chloe, French, 38 y/o, married, 4 y/o and 1 y/o
twins).
It’s not a problem for me to resort to egg donation because in fact the child will
grow in me, it is me who will carry him/her, feel him/her grow, move, etc. When the
embryo is put in my body, it’s just cells, it’s not a human being yet. (...) In any case,
this  child  will  be  ours  whatever  happens  because  we  want  her  so  much  (Lily,
French, 38 y/o, civil union, no children).
There  is  a  very  resolute  operation  here  that  tries  to  transform  closeness  into
distance because donors’ proximity is considered uncomfortable. The third-party
donor is completely reduced to an instrument in the couples’ parental project: these
women try to withdraw the donor’s individuality and ability to become someone
close,  thus reducing him/her to a functionality.  After  all,  the  principal  focus is
transforming what, through the technical/medical act of insemination, grows into a
life  form.  The  couples’  instrumentalisation  of  the  donor  is  supported  by  the
discourse of professionals who surround infertile couples; they themselves reduce
life to its functional aspects, as evidenced by the vocabulary used in the medical
discourse12 on ART with a third-party donor (Delaunay & Martins, 2015).
5. The  unbearable  presence  of  the  third  party  in  AI/IVF:  the  detachment
operation
The donor’s  construction  as  a  living  entity  (supplier  of  genetic  material  to  an
infertile  couple)  and not  as  a particular  person (anonymous and depersonalized
donation) is emancipatory and allows the couple to restrict intimate feelings to the
traditional nuclear family unit. I call this a "detachment operation" from the third-
party donor (Delaunay, 2017). Analyzing the progressive evolution of detachment
thus makes it possible to show how the initial embarrassment vis-à-vis the third
party becomes a problem that affects both people and institutions more seriously.
12 The doctors we met questioned whether the child has a fundamental right to search for her genetic origins;
likewise,  they question the  idea  that  knowing one’s  genetic  origins  is  important  for  the  child’s  personal
development. For them, genes and reproductive cells are simply a medium for biological information. Genetic
knowledge  is  only  clinically  and  scientifically  relevant  when  it  aims  at  preventing  the  transmission  of
hereditary genetic disorders (screening for disease in donors or the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis).
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In  this  attempt  by  the  recipient  couple  to  free  themselves  from the  third-party
donor, there is a kind of detachment in a physical sense (putting a distance between
them  and  the  donor  by  ignoring  gametes’  origin)  but  also  a  sort  of  “de-
commitment” or deprivation, in a moral and especially legal sense (the third-person
is deprived of parental rights or responsibilities).
This detachment operation applies not only to others (the third-party donor), but
also to oneself and one’s body, both objectively and subjectively. The desire to
become a parent leads these women to agree to renounce contributing with their
genetic material (or that of their spouse) to conceive the child.
It  seems important to discuss how materiality (expressed in flesh, blood and
food metaphors) and information (genes) are used by couples who seek ART with
third-party  donors,  helping  them  to  articulate  different  ways  of  defining  and
reconfiguring  social  and  biological  relatedness;  for  them,  kin  structure  is
remediated  through  the  mechanism  of  chance  and  the  use  of  technology
(Harrington et al., 2008).
In the case of oocyte donation —in contrast to surrogacy— the focus is not on
the genetic  but  rather  the  biological  and social  components  of  parenthood.  For
future  parents,  what  matters  is  not  genes  —as  the  excerpts  below show— but
bodily experiences of pregnancy and childbirth by the receiving woman, as well as
the child’s care and education by both parents. Interviewees’ idea of parenthood is
thus reconfigured, as are their ideas about corporality, since in both cases —genetic
and gestational motherhood— biogenetic ties are equally highly valued.
From the moment it was possible for me to get pregnant, I renounced my genetic
material. (...) For me, it’s just a detail to achieve a pregnancy. So, it doesn’t bother
me emotionally, nor even does being the recipient of another woman’s eggs (Dani,
Portuguese, 39 y/o, married, no children).
It wasn’t difficult at all for me to accept egg donation. I said to myself, "Well, I
don’t have oocytes, so if I use a donor who is younger, has no health problems, etc.,
that will give... We have enough oocytes to have embryos and, anyway, it’s me who
will receive and carry the developing embryos throughout the pregnancy, so there is
no problem" (Lily, French, 38 y/o, civil union, no children).
Insofar as the donor is deprived of an existence as an individual (depersonalization)
and sperm is  conceived as  interchangeable  material  (within a  desexualized and
medicalized donation), the anonymity rule applied to gamete donors enables the
maintenance of a biologizing model of the traditional family (parenthood within a
heterosexual  couple)  and  the  illusion  that  the  social  parents  are  the  biological
parents  (primacy  of  social  kinship  over  biological  kinship);  it  also  avoids  the
spectre  of  adultery  or  incest  (Mathieu,  2013).  However,  while  medical  teams’
arguments  insist  on  social  fatherhood  (the  father  is  the  one  who  develops  the
parental project and raises the children), there is a biologisation of motherhood (the
woman  is  a  mother  because  she  is  pregnant  even  if  she  is  not  a  progenitor)
(ibidem).
Likewise,  lesbian  couples  encountered,  in  both  France  and  Portugal,  have
chosen anonymous sperm donors (except for one couple who opted for a semi-
anonymous  donor).  Ideally,  their  homoparental  project  involves  both  women
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getting pregnant, one at a time, from the same male donor. This expresses both
concerns about the statutory difference between biological motherhood and social
motherhood, and the desire to create genetic links between their children (for them
to be half-siblings). Moreover, clinics in Spain match the physical characteristics of
the sperm donor with those of the non-birth mother in order to create the semblance
of a genetically related two-parent family.
In the case of France and Portugal,  the use of ART can be analysed as “the
expression of a preference for the ‘biological’ component of parenthood” (Fine &
Martial, 2010: 129). The attempt to perpetuate genes, the desire to have a child
conceived with the gametes of at least one of the partners (Fortier, 2009), along
with women’s will to experience pregnancy and childbirth, demonstrate how ART
contributes to the “biologisation” of parenthood, while being organized around this
already-existing understanding of kinship. Having a child genetically linked to one
of the partners gives the couple a sense of genetic continuity through generations;
the “as if” family thus created is placed at the heart of a history that unfolds both
backwards and forwards in time (Shanley, 2002).13
Although  motherhood  seems  quite  indivisible  in  both  widespread  social
representations and legal definitions, ART has enabled an unprecedented division
within reproduction (Delaisi de Parseval, 2008; Courduriès, 2016). Depending on
the  case,  motherhood may assume three different  meanings  or  dimensions:  the
woman who contributes with her genetic material even if she has no physiological
possibility of getting pregnant (progenitor or genetic mother); the woman who is
pregnant for nine months and who gives birth (gestational mother); or the woman
who planned and developed a parental project and who will  raise the child she
desired, even though she is unable to conceive her biologically (intended mother or
social mother).
In the excerpts below, the heterosexual women interviewed discuss the primacy
of affective and social parenthood (emotional bonds and child-rearing), which is
superimposed on genetic links. Bodily and biological dimensions are important,
but  are  not  sufficient  to  define  a  human  being.  They  are  concerned  with  the
question of individuation, the fabrication  in utero of a unique person, who will
further develop special affective attachments.
There was the question of biology and DNA. All this is very complicated, but I
think it was also a journey. (...) I can tell you this internalization process wasn’t very
easy, but I quickly came to the conclusion that biology is worth what it is worth and
maybe here it has little value (...) because we can have good genes, but it’s not genes
that make people. It’s people who make people. Of course,  I would like  —and I
think that my husband would have liked it too— to have a son or a daughter who
had my characteristics  (...),  but  we can list  a lot  of  people who have biological
children who do not look like their parents. So what does it matter? What matters is
the love and education you give to a child. And maybe biology is not as crucial as
we thought it could be. For me, I got used to the idea (Tita, Portuguese,  36 y/o,
married, no children).
13 However, this may not be a general characteristic, but rather specific to the French and Portuguese situations
and to the countries studied in the research. For example, Melhuus (2012) found this not to be so in Norway,
where people who could have one partner as the genetic parent, seem to tend to prefer adoption in order to
avoid any asymmetry in the parents’ relationships with the child.
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I  understand  the  curiosity  to  know  of  those  who  are  the  result  of  a  gamete
donation. However, it’s a curiosity, my eyes or mouth are similar, but it shouldn’t go
further. It’s an often repeated motto, but the father and the mother are the ones who
raise the child. (...) Genetics is unquestionable and inseparable from the individual
because it’s written into the genetic code. Nevertheless, it’s not genetics that defines
us. My children are twins and completely different from each other. Much of what
they are, it’s obviously inscribed in their genes, but what they are becoming bears
my trace and that of my husband. Everything else comes from the experience, the
experience of each person (Bia, Portuguese, 34 y/o, married, 4 y/o twins).
The  distinctions  made  here  have  to  do  with  the  “innate/acquired”  and  the
“nature/culture” (or “nature/nurture”) divides. There is a debate over the relative
importance  of  heredity  (nature)  and  environment  (culture)  in  a  child’s
development, i.e. a question of whether the formation and development of a person
and her behavior are determined by genetic heritage or by education.
However, the women interviewed share the idea that there is no direct causality
between genetics and bodily resemblance (physiognomic or gestural) or psychic
similarities  (attitudes  and behaviors)  between parents  and their  offspring.  They
highlight  the  essentially  acquired  character  of  certain  similarities  (facial
expressions, ways of walking and talking, etc.) through mimesis and identification.
They also stress the socially constructed character of parenthood, both at socio-
legal and emotional  levels.  For them, the person (the donor-conceived child) is
socially constituted within a nuclear family (prospective parents). The focus is on
ontogenesis, the development of the individual from conception to adulthood. This
is  the  process  through which a  “living thing” (the gamete)  becomes a  “human
being” (a person-to-be), in the philosophical sense of “coming into being.”
Ambiguity and ambivalence characterize this intermediate or transitional stage
between an indeterminate set of cells (third-party donor gametes seen as body parts
that medicine helps to combine with one partner’s genetic material) and the future
child as a person “in the process of becoming”. This developing person is enrolled
into a parental project, and is therefore considered a human being. The concept of
“liminality”  (Turner,  1969)  and the classic  example of  the  boy-man in rites  of
passage, who shares two contradictory roles,14 can be employed here. The liminal
space of indeterminacy and uncertainty between two states in the ART process,
where it is difficult to set limits, creates anxieties. But these anxieties are somewhat
reduced among women during pregnancy and childbirth,  because  of  the  strong
biological  links  they  establish  successively  with  the  embryo,  the  fetus  and the
already-born child.
ART “makes parents” as well as children: it redefines parenting and the ways it
is  embodied,  disembodied  and  re-embodied.  ART  inextricably  links  different
institutional contexts, from ethics committees to ART centers, including legislative
bodies, and entangles heavy normative processes (Thompson, 2005). Through an
14 When Victor Turner studied the rituals of the Ndembu people in Zambia, he identified three phases of rites of
passage,  according  to  Van Gennep’s  theory:  separation,  liminality,  and incorporation.  In  the  liminal  and
intermediate stage, individuals are no longer boys, but they are not yet men either; it is the ambiguity and the
paradox of the in-between. During this transitional stage, of threshold, they develop intense relational links
between them, which the author describes as communitas, an absolute interhuman relation beyond any form of
structure.
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“ontological choreography” (Thompson, 2005), composed of coordinated efforts
from  different  actors  involved  (couples,  doctors,  legislators,  etc.)  and  the
interdependent dynamics of biological reproduction at the technological, scientific,
personal, legal, political and financial levels, ART helps to either (re)interpret or
normalize  and  naturalize  kinship  as  well  as  gender  roles  (even  if  the  parents
provide neither gametes nor uterus),  thereby establishing new relations between
science, technology and society.
6. Gay male surrogacy: mutual choice and reciprocal engagement
Within homoparental projects,  the third-party donor (whether anonymous, semi-
anonymous or known) is not likely to be totally erased, nor gamete donation to be
concealed (Théry, 2010). Where access to ART is opened up to same-sex couples,
public  controversies  about  donor  anonymity,  access  to  origins  and  attitudes
towards third parties should gain new momentum. Indeed, it is impossible to keep
secrets about conception or to preserve the invisible existence of the donor (Mehl,
2008), and this changes the pseudo-procreative model that prevails in the ART law
in France and, until recently, also in Portugal.
In gay male couples’ ART projects, the third-party role is, conversely, of great
relevance and wrapped in new cultural meanings. Nevertheless, it also raises major
socio-political problems in the public sphere between what is allowed and what is
forbidden in ethical terms. The parental projects of the gay couples interviewed did
not  start  with  surrogacy.  Due  to  the  ethical  and  financial  stakes  involved  in
surrogacy (couples were reluctant to choose what at the time was a controversial
and still  unknown practice),  couples ruled out  this  possibility at  the beginning.
After attending discussion groups at the French APGL (Association of Gay and
Lesbian  Parents  and  Future  Parents)  and  ADFH (Association  of  Homoparental
Families)  and  meeting  others  involved  in  the  same  process,  the  gay  couples
considered other options such as adoption and co-parenting.
However, gay couples faced difficulties adopting abroad. Although one of the
partners applied, as a single person, to adopt in several foreign countries, there are
long waiting lists, a lot of uncertainty and no response in most cases. Moreover,
these couples’ desire to carry out a project of their own (“a real family of our own”,
“our child”, “to welcome a child into a loving family unit”) and not with other
people (that is to say, with a lesbian couple or a single woman) have led them to
reject co-parenting due to concerns about the child’s stability. According to the
interviewees,  co-parenting  would  require  prior  time  to  build  a  relationship  of
mutual  trust  and  friendship  between  the  two  couples.  It  could  be  a  source  of
uncertainty and future problems concerning kinship ties with the child, but could
also  result  in  a  lack  of  control  over  time,  jeopardising  the  stability  of  the
arrangement. Sharing the child’s life and education with a female couple would
mean a loss of a considerable part of the parenting experience. Other recent studies
report the same findings (Gross, 2018).
Following several years of unsuccessful attempts to adopt, and especially after
overcoming  their  previous  reluctance,  the  four  couples  interviewed  decided  to
resort to a surrogate in the United States. According to them, and compared with
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most countries providing surrogacy, the process in the U.S. is more ethical and
legally regulated (offering the possibility of returning with their child to France
with a passport and a proof of paternity).
Unlike in other studies which have found that both men share or alternate sperm
provision for the child’s conception (Dempsey, 2013),  my interviewees decided
that just one partner would be the sperm donor and therefore the biological father.
The choice has to do with different criteria: personal desire (one of the gay men is
more willing and ready for fatherhood); family circumstances (one partner is an
only child and this is the only way to give his parents grandchildren); economic
constraints (due to the high costs of surrogacy in the United States often just one
attempt per couple is  allowed).  Nevertheless,  parenthood is shared between the
biological  father  and the social  one.  Biogenetic  relatedness  and other  forms of
relatedness (such as those based on devotion, reproductive desire, individual will
and determination) complement each other to make kinship real and to strengthen
gay men’s affinity with their children (Nebeling Petersen, 2016).
The  process  of  arranging  transnational  commercial  surrogacy  involved  an
agency (for choosing the surrogate), a clinic (for selecting the oocyte donor) and a
lawyer to represent the couple on legal issues (the contract with the surrogate, legal
documentation to allow the child to leave the United States, etc.). To begin with the
agency offers a woman available for surrogacy who has matched with the couple
based  on  criteria  they  have  previously  determined.  The  couple  meets  with  the
candidate and gets to know her and in most cases also her husband. 15 One of the
respondents draws a parallel between these agencies’ selection of the surrogate and
the modus operandi of a marriage agency. Another even compares the first meeting
to a “romantic date”, using expressions like “love at first sight.” The surrogate’s
selection is either described as her own choice (“there was a surrogate who chose
us”) or as a reciprocal selection (“it is a mutual choice, it’s a co-decision”).
When I was shown the profile, I did not see myself saying, "Oh yes, it’s good, but
have you a second choice if this one does not work?" I think it’s already so generous
that a person has agreed to meet us. (…) For me, if a person agrees to do that, it’s
already huge. (…) We went to the agency and we met and it was a little weird. I had
the impression that it was a romantic date. I was rather relaxed at the idea of meeting
her because I had a good impression in advance and it was confirmed when she
came later and we met properly. (…) The husband was there too all the time. And
we stayed for two and a half hours with her, to get to know each other. We talked
about everything. We talked about this project, we talked about what she did in life.
(...) It went very well and I think we were very moved, all four of us, during this
interview and we had a sort of "love at first sight". Afterwards she told us that she
had immediately felt that we were the couple that she was looking for, because she
felt at ease with us, and my companion and myself immediately felt comfortable too
(Lucas, French, 35 y/o, partnership, no children).
For  certain  groups,  surrogacy  raises  the  question  of  lack  of  respect  for  the
principles of the inalienability of the human body and the non-commodification of
15  Surrogates  proposed  by  these  agencies  in  the  USA are  always  married,  heterosexual  and  already  have
children of their own.
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living  beings  or  human  life.  Although  the  surrogacy  arrangement  began  as  a
commercial  exchange  for  the  prospective  parents,  surrogates  shifted  their
understanding of it so it became seen as a gift relationship: “the payment doesn’t
eclipse the gift” (Teman, 2010: 211).
It  is  the  surrogate  herself  who  helps  dissipate  possible  concerns  and
uncertainties through her speech and by revealing her motivations. The idea of the
woman who carries a child for another couple only because of monetary incentives
is deconstructed. The financial issue associated with surrogacy is recognized (a
desire  to  improve  living  standards)  but  it  is  not  construed  as  these  women’s
primary  motive.  Besides  personal  fulfilment  through  being  pregnant,  they  are
motivated both by the altruistic desire to help others and by their direct experiences
of other people’s suffering. This rhetoric helps to transform the surrogacy project
into pure gifting.
French political conservatives see surrogacy only as a way of commoditizing and
belittling women. (…) when we met our accomplice —I like to call her that— I still
had that question in mind: Why is she doing this? And why should I benefit from the
fact that she is a woman to have a child of my own? I used the term benefit. I won’t
use it anymore. She explained to us that her husband, who confirmed all this, was an
adopted  child  and  when  he  was  growing  up,  his  parents  always  made  him
understand how painful it was for them not to have children and the possibility of
adopting him had been a blessing for them. So she completely understands the desire
of a sterile couple who cannot have children together  —which two homosexuals
necessarily are— to have a child. Then she wanted to help one of her friends who
could not have children. So she was thinking of doing what she is doing with us
today for her friend, but her friend finally managed to get pregnant.  And so she
thought, why not give that chance to someone else too? When we spoke with her, I
felt a lot of sincerity in all that. She kept talking about the donation she gave us,
about gifts (Lucas, French, 35 y/o, partnership, no children).
We met Patricia, the surrogate mother, and in fact it was Patricia who completely
uninhibited us, who blew the lock on what a surrogate mother was and all that it
meant, because she was the antithesis of the image one might have of a surrogate
mother. (...) I think Patricia and her husband Tom, they contributed a lot to changing
the image. (…) her motivations, there are two main ones: (…) her happiness at being
pregnant, without necessarily having the project of having other children of her own,
and the second thing, which was more political, she had been raised by a gay uncle
who had died of AIDS and (…) she wanted to carry a child for a male couple. I
think her surrogacy project was [motivated by] the combination of several  things
(Simon, French, 36 y/o, married to Jean, 2 y/o twins).
The  relationship  between  prospective  parents  and  the  surrogate  is  nevertheless
hybrid: it is not only contractual and monetized, but also based on gift and counter-
gift; the continued relationship seems the best way to express mutual friendship
and appreciation (Berend, 2014; Teman, 2010).
Homosexual  couples build a strong connection with the surrogate,  based on
generosity  and  gifting  (a  “blessing”  or  a  “gift”  even  if  she  was  paid  for  her
gestational  services)  as  well  as  friendship  and  complicity  (“our  friend”,  “our
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accomplice”). In homoparental projects, as opposed to heterosexual ones, a third
party —the  surrogate  mother— actively intervenes.  The  woman who hosts  the
embryo  plays  an  active  role  because  the  arrangement  requires  the  reciprocal
openness of each party (the gay couple and the surrogate) to the intimacy of the
other.
For me it’s a human adventure. When we first contacted the agency, I asked them
what kind of relationship we could hope for with whoever would give birth to our
child. I could not imagine spending nine months without information about how she
was doing and beyond that it’s so generous what she does for us, I really wanted to
have a friendly relationship with her. It was important, essential even, that we could
get along with her. (…) The agency took note of it. I asked them about the attitude
of same-sex couples taking this approach  to the carrier  and she told me that  all
homosexual  couples  actually  wanted  to  have  a  close  relationship  with  whoever
would carry the child.  Conversely,  she told me that  heterosexual  couples almost
refused to have contact with whoever carried the children. In that case it was more
like "we make an order and we get the child back in the end" (Lucas, French, 35 y/o,
partnership, no children).
In fact, the language used by these couples to describe the surrogate and the nature
of her contribution to the parental project itself serves to create social bonds and
intimate relationships between the various protagonists. For example, one of the
surrogates  is  compared  to  an  “aunt”  or  a  “godmother”  and  this  designation
inscribes her into the child’s kinship system. Another couple describes these new
relationships as “extended family”. Through what I call “bonding efforts in a logic
of  reciprocity”,  they elaborate  an enlarged kinship universe.  These couples  see
their  children  like  interpersonal  human  beings,  having  close  relationships  with
people other than the nuclear family, who are also part of their personal story.
We were there at the child’s birth. We had a room at the clinic, next to Samantha’s
room, all together. Obviously we stayed with her after. (…) for 15 days after the
birth, we regularly went to Samantha’s place, we dined at their home with the baby,
she bottle-fed him, she changed his diapers. We wanted to do this gently, without
the brutality of saying, "Now it’s OK, you completed your contract, bye". For us it
was impossible to do something like that. And at the airport (…) it was a difficult
moment  because  she  cried,  we cried,  everyone  cried  since  everyone  loves  each
other. At that moment she said, "You are extended family". That’s it, it became an
extended  family  with  them.  (…)  And  we  are  in  touch  regularly.  We  talk  on
Facebook. Even today, six years after the first child was born, we chat. There is a
bond  and  that  bond  will  remain  through  my  life.  I  know  it,  because  it’s  so
extraordinary what she did, that I cannot even imagine not answering her if she asks
me a question or not being there if she needs us (Adrien, French, 48 y/o, married, 6
y/o and 3 y/o children).
Other  studies  also  mention  exchanges  by  email,  Skype  and  other  forms  of
communication  in  order  to  maintain  ties  with  the  surrogate  (see  Gross,  2012,
Smietana  et al.,  2014). Gay couples carry out a real relational work in order to
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create links with the surrogate and sometimes also with the egg donor, and thus
guarantee their  children access to their origins (see Dempsey, 2015 as cited by
Gross, 2018). As I will describe below in more detail, French gay couples invest
work and time in negotiating relationships with the third party through permanent
social interactions, thus forming a relational network.
7. Surrogate children’s personhood: gay male couples’ perspective
We have, on the one hand, the configuration of corporeality and, on the other hand,
the  fabrication  of  personhood.  Bodily  components  are  mobilized  to  construct
arguments that the child has the right to know her origins, because she is made of
the biological  and genetic contributions of others that  are also part  of  her own
personal genealogy and family narrative. The child is viewed as a social entity with
a  relational  identity,  whose  best  interest  and  well-being  are  taken  into
consideration.
The gay couple’s relationship with the surrogate is nurtured both during and
after pregnancy, outside the agency’s regulated setting. Same-sex couples meet the
surrogate and her husband, they exchange e-mails and photographs of pregnancy
stages, they use Skype and Facebook to talk. They are present at the ultrasound
scan to find out the sex of the child and also at their birth. There is a performative
dimension, whereby the couple’s constant involvement in the process (their joint
endeavor), helps them as conceivers of a parental project to consider themselves
future parents, and thus to perform the transition between intention and action.
In the beginning the relationship is artificially created by the agency, when there
is a match between the couple and the surrogate. But after this inaugural moment,
these couples voluntarily invest in maintaining this desired relationship, in order to
create  bonds,  despite  the  contract’s  financial  side.  This  introduces  new
relationships  where  free  will  and  intention  have  a  major  place  in  the  social
construction of kinship.
Nevertheless, every party has their  own distinct role appropriate to this new
family configuration. Third parties are not parents and do not have the right to
interfere  with  their  children’s  education,  because  they  do  not  belong  to  the
domestic unit or nuclear family. Two factors make a gay family produced through
surrogacy  more  similar  to  a  traditional  heterosexual  nuclear  family  than  other
forms  of  homoparenthood:  first,  the  possibility  of  forming  a  nuclear  family
consisting of only two legal parents with children biogenetically related to at least
one of them; second,  control  over the reproductive process (Nebeling Petersen,
2016).  At  the  same  time,  the  absence  of  a  mother  makes  such  families  very
different to traditional heterosexual nuclear families in terms of gendered norms
(ibidem). Gay couples have to manage the tension between old and new forms of
family subjectivity and creation by doing “affective work” in contexts dominated
by heteronormative social  understandings (ibidem).  This is  because “a range of
symbols and metaphors very conventional to heterosexual nuclear family formation
are  in  play in  this  ostensibly unconventional  context”  (Dempsey,  2013,  p.  51).
Since “reproductive heterosex” remains the norm against  which other modes of
procreation  are  measured,  gay  couples  who  use  offshore  surrogacy  experience
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“reproductive vulnerability” arising from their families being formed outside the
norm (Riggs & Due, 2013).
Despite lacking parental  authority and responsibilities,  the surrogate and her
husband are considered part of the gay couple’s family. This is a kind of “extended
family” that has been forged and enlarged over time, based on regular contact and
strong and lasting attachments. This continuous sharing includes both important
life events (being invited to the couple’s wedding) and occasional leisure activities
(joint vacations or exchanging posts and comments on Facebook).
It will be our child, not hers. From the moment she agrees to donate, it is not her
child. We have raised her, but I would be really happy, glad if [the surrogate] could
share our life. Even from afar, in a friendly way, through photos from time to time
(Lucas, French, 35 y/o, partnership, no children).
It is clear for us that we are the dads, we are the parents, but we want to create a
bond for as long as possible. (...) And I think we were very lucky because she is an
exceptional surrogate mother. (...) I think it was precisely when we met Patricia that
the third party role was forged and materialized (Simon, French, 36 y/o, married to
Jean, 2 y/o twins).
We know that Patricia will have a role, a proper role in the story. There has never
been any ambiguity about her role. She is not the mother, but at the same time she is
not  a  stranger  either.  It’s  a  special  role,  maybe  a  little  bit  like  an  aunt  or  a
godmother. (…) She has already seen the children because she has been to France
many times  since  they  were  born.  She  came  to  our  wedding.  (…)  She  has  not
interfered in our family life. It’s more than a friend. She is part of the family, but not
the nuclear family (Jean, French, 39 y/o, married to Simon, 2 y/o twins).
This trend is corroborated by other recent studies on the relationships gay couples
have with women who carried and helped to  give life  to  their  children,  where
surrogacy sometimes creates a real “family innovation” —a “quasi-family”— and
affinity is seen as a condition for success (Gross, 2018). In daily life, the child is
raised by two fathers in a motherless scenario. However, the way couples envisage
the  story  of  this  conception,  and tell  it  to  their  children,  does  not  exclude  the
representation of women who have contributed to their coming into the world as
“mothers”  with  whom  they  want  to  retain  links  (ibidem).  The  language  of
“friendship”  and  “extended  family”16 can  help  us  understand  the  relationships
between the prospective fathers,  the  surrogate-born children  and the surrogates
(Dempsey, 2015 as cited in Gross, 2018). Nevertheless, the closeness, nature and
frequency  of  contacts  depend  on  national  contexts,  i.e.  on  the  socio-cultural
proximity between the prospective parents and the surrogate (Courduriès, 2016),
e.g. differences between surrogacy frameworks in the United States and in India.
16 This trend cannot just be explained by gay couples’ effort to conform to the sexual alterity norm they also
break through homosexual  conjugality.  In  fact,  long-term,  large-scale  studies  on the  relationships  among
gestational  carriers  point  to  similar  relations  (extended  families  and  the  like)  for  heterosexual  users  of
surrogacy (see Jadva & Imrie, 2014; Söderström-Anttila et al., 2015). In general, compared with families who
use other forms of third-party reproduction, surrogacy families have been found to be more open about how
their child was conceived. There is also continued contact between the surrogate’s family and the intended
family and their relationship remains close (ibidem).
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One of these couples had already spoken to the surrogate about the possibility
of a second child (they had cryopreserved embryos) because they did not want to
invest in the relationship with another surrogate with a different  story. Another
couple had already had two children with the same surrogate at her suggestion,
because she did not want to start the process for another couple with whom she
might have a worse relationship. As in Teman’s study (2010), there seems to be a
“sense of alliance” and personal commitment between the couple and the surrogate
regarding the children already born or yet to be born. 
In addition to the biological and genetic anchoring of kinship, a cultural and
symbolic  foundation  is  being  constructed  through  the  redefinition  of  the
relationships between the prospective parents (including the male progenitor), the
oocyte donor and the surrogate.
Regarding  the  egg  donor,  it’s  more  complicated  because  she  has  the  right  to
anonymity. However, we have the possibility of contacting her via a third party, the
possibility of contacting her anonymously, and we will probably use this possibility
to ask her later if she is ready to communicate with us, to give or receive some news
and maybe answer the child’s questions once she has them. (...) I think it’s desirable
to keep this relationship [with the surrogate] because we have lived this story with
her, partly with her. It’s more of a long-term relationship than with the oocyte donor
because after all we haven’t met her and she has donated at a given moment in time.
After  all,  maybe for  the  child  it  will  be more  important  to  know her  biological
mother. I don’t know (Théo, French, 35 y/o, civil union, no children).
Concerning the donor, it was just as important to us that she wasn’t anonymous,
but it’s complicated and in the United States we didn’t find donors who weren’t
anonymous. However,  there is an arrangement where donors are anonymous, but
when children turn 18 they have the opportunity to know who she is. (…) we wanted
our children to know the truth of their story. And so it seemed acceptable to us to
say that we didn’t know the anonymous donor, but when they are adults, they have
the possibility of doing it,  they can see,  know, get  in touch with the donor,  the
biological parent, to get in touch with the surrogate mother and then have the whole
picture. (…) the surrogate mother was considered to be a fundamental person in the
children’s  story and we talked a lot about this,  the relationship we had with the
surrogate mother (Simon, French, 36 y/o, married to Jean, 2 y/o twins).
Despite  the  principle  of  the  egg donors’  anonymity that  prevails  in  the  United
States,  all  the  gay couples  interviewed preferred semi-anonymity:  they chose a
donor  who  would  remove  anonymity  after  the  child  had  reached  the  age  of
majority  and  expressed  a  desire  to  know her.  She  is  thus  sometimes  called  a
“genetic mother” or “biological mother.” The donor is always secondary, but the
child’s access to her own origins (“identity”,  “story”) is  prioritised. Prospective
parents performatively invest in a network of possible long-term connections of
relatedness and genealogy. Although there is not so much investment in personal
relationships,  some couples  keep  in  touch with  the  egg donor  by  email,  either
directly  or  through  an  intermediary.  The  donor  must  always  remain  reachable
throughout her life and must inform the couples of any change of address.
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We had two main conditions that weren’t up for discussion. It’s obviously that she
is in good health, and second, we wanted her to agree to lift her anonymity. The
donation is anonymous in the United States, but we wanted her to give her true
identity.  (…)  I  realized  that  many  children  who  did  not  know  their  parents
experienced pain, sometimes trauma, from not knowing their genetic background.
And, since it is not actually a normal procedure nowadays, I really wanted to be sure
to do my utmost for the well-being of my future child. (...) That if our child decides
to contact her, that she agrees to get in touch with him or her, without necessarily
developing a friendship, having a relationship, but that our child can meet her if she
wishes,  to  know  at  least  who  her  genetic  mother  is  (Lucas,  French,  35  y/o,
partnership, no children).
The  donor  is  semi-anonymous  because  we  want  to  be  able  to  answer  all  our
children’s questions. If they ask “who gave the little seed?”, we’ll say “come on,
we’ll take a plane, we’ll go to the United States, we’ll see her”. If he says “I don’t
want to see her”, that’s no problem, we won’t see her. It’s not an obligation. It’s a
tool. (…) We won’t force him to meet the donor. He decides (Adrien, French, 48
y/o, married, 6 y/o and 3 y/o children).
Splitting motherhood into two dimensions (genetic and gestational)  reduces  the
physical  and  biological  role  of  each  woman  while  recognizing  both  their
contributions  (Gross,  2018).  It  allows  the  gay  couple  (prospective  parents)  to
strengthen  their  prominence  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  childbearing  project
(Courduriès, 2016). At the same time, the presence of whoever carried and gave
birth to the child “allows the natural appearance of procreation to be preserved”, in
a  hostile  context  where  surrogacy  is  seen  as  “artificial  and  disembodied
reproduction” (ibidem: 60). The difference between surrogates and oocyte donors
is undoubtedly related to the way US agencies and clinics encourage contact with
the carrier before and during the entire pregnancy while donors are usually selected
through an online catalogue without personal contact (Dempsey, 2015, as cited by
Gross, 2018; Murphy, 2015).
These couples attribute particular importance to genetic and medical factors in
their choice of donor, i.e. factors related to physiognomy and age (health, success
rates, ethnic match, etc.). Nevertheless, it seems to be a rejection of a market logic
when gay couples seek to move away from the role of the consumer/customer —
who is able to choose reproductive services and exert control over biology and
reproduction— by,  for  example,  trying not  to  select  the  donor  as  if  through a
casting or mail-order catalogue.
The in vitro fertilization clinic has a database with egg donor candidates. With lots
of  information, photographs,  physical  information, a lot  of health information as
well as more personal information about who she is, what she does in life, why she
is doing this, what she thinks about it, etc. So we have all this information and we
choose according to that. The more important criteria were... very hard to say, but
were health, age, since we were advised to pick someone relatively young. After that
general assessment, we chose both based on their physical appearance and according
to  what  they  wrote  in  their  descriptions  (Théo,  French,  35  y/o,  civil  union,  no
children).
Delaunay, C. Polít. Soc. (Madr.) 56(2) 2019:  381-404 401
It  was  more  complicated  for  us  regarding  the  donor.  We realized  we  needed
criteria. What are our criteria? So we chose very simple criteria. We said we want
someone Caucasian, to avoid... Caucasian. We wanted her to have children already
or for her to have already donated and it worked, because we didn’t want failures.
(...) We wanted local people. We didn’t want something complicated and, most of
all, we didn’t want to do it by catalogue (Jean, French, 39 y/o, married to Simon, 2
y/o twins).
The  incorporation  of  biomedical  technologies  and  procedures,  i.e.  “embodied
progress”  (Franklin,  1997),  raises  novel  sociocultural  dilemmas.  Technological
innovation and scientific progress make possible new forms of choice,  creating
uncertainty and introducing relativism into kinship definition. Parenthood, kinship
and procreation are culturally redefined (and even destabilized and denaturalized)
within ART. “New reproductive technologies not only create new persons; they
create new relations” (ibidem: 4). Thus, they have repercussions on the meanings
of  relatedness,  and  specifically  on  kinship  understood  in  the  traditional
anthropological sense of ties established through procreation.
8. Conclusions
Third-party  reproduction  (gamete  donation  and  gestational  surrogacy)  is  a
technologically-mediated  way  of  bringing  a  child  into  the  world  and  forging
innovative  family  ties.  It  reveals  the  continuity  of  a  naturalistic  conception  of
kinship based on the valorization of a common biogenetic substance linking one of
the prospective parents and the child. Biological processes such as pregnancy and
delivery remain of great significance.
Although it is possible to standardize and regulate technical procedures (despite
differences between national  legislations that generate cross-border reproductive
care and its subsequent criminalization), dilemmatic tensions persist because they
are inherent to the process. How can couples call the child their own when she was
created with the genetic material of a third party? Even if heterosexual couples —
and also lesbian couples— are engaged in a clear, voluntary process of anonymized
gamete donation, the third party remains a threatening presence. Therefore, they
develop arguments  moving away from the concept  of  the  third party as  a  real
individual and focusing on the substance donated.
Conversely,  the  prevalence  of  a  genealogical  model  of  kinship  leads  gay
couples to forge “family-like” ties with surrogates. They are concerned to avoid
depriving  the  child  of  the  story of  her  conception and birth,  but  they  are  also
concerned  to  combat  negative  images  and  ethical  controversies  associating
surrogacy with women’s exploitation and body commodification.
The interviewees’ conceptualization of third-party reproduction is based on the
dichotomous  opposition  of  gifts  and  commodities.  The  “contractual  exchange”
with third parties is either used by heterosexual couples to reduce the third-party
role to a strict functionality (commodification) or, by contrast, it remains a spectre
that  gay couples  try  to  ward  off  by forging human and emotional  connections
(collaboration).
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However, the differences among couples’ attitudes towards the third party when
using  these  reproductive  techniques  cut  across  different  sexual  orientations.  In
other words, these differences may be explained by the differences between using
(solely) gamete donation and using gestational surrogacy, instead of those that exist
between heterosexual and gay couples.17
Certain  advances  in  biomedicine,  such  as  ART,  have  made  it  possible  to
broaden  the  human  experience;  but  they  have  also  re-elaborated  the  line  of
demarcation drawn between living forms and human beings, while reconfiguring
the contemporary conception of kinship and family.
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